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At their recent annual sumrnlt in Vietnam, the Leaders of
the 21 members of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) forum launched a process that could ultimately
produce the largest single act of trade liberalization in his-
tory. They agreed to «seriously consider» negotiating a Free
Trade Área of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP) and instructed their
officials to «undertake furrher studies on ways and means
to promote» the initiative, so that they could address it at
next year's summit in Australia.
The APEC members account for more than half the world
economy and about half of world trade. Henee any agree-
ment that approached free trade among the group would
be even more far-reaching, in trade terms, than the Euro-
pean Community or the North American Free Trade Agree-
menr. It would be much more extensiva than any of the
global liberalizíng compacts previously negotiated in the
GATTorenvisaged in thecurrentDoha Round inthe World
Trade Organizarían. Doha of course remains highly desir-
able, and the APEC Leaders reaffirmed their commitment
to its success, but the FTAAP would be by far the best avaii-
able «Plan B» to restart widespread trade-liberalizing mo-
mentum if multilateral progress remains blocked in Geneva.
C. Fred Bergsten is Director of the recently renamed Pecer G.
Peterson Institute for Internacional Economías. He was Chair-
man of APEC's Eminenc Persons Group, which developed the
inicial blueprintfor the organization's trade stracegy, throughout
its existente from 1993 through 1995.
159
Estudios Internacionales 156 (2007) * Universidad de Chile
The FTAAP idea has been actively promoted by APEC's
Business Advisory Council since 2004 as the only means
by which APEC could achieve its signature goal, adopted
in 1993 and reaffirmed every year since (includingat Hanoi),
of achieving «free and open trade and investment in the
región.» Ir suddenly became a focal point of this year's
official activity because of major shifts in policy positions
by several key member economies.
The United States took the lead in promoting the initia-
tive, and the Leaders unanimously endorsed President Bush's
cali to give it «serious consideración» in a speech in
Singapore just before the summit. Japan welcomed the idea,
in tándem with its own recent proposal for an «economic
partnership agreement» amongthe 16 leading Asían coun-
tries (includíng India, which is not a member of APEC).
Australia, which will play a key role as chairman of APEC
over the next year, reiterated its support. So did Canadá
and México, two of the six largest APEC economies and
traders, along with several of the smaller members. Henee
the FTAAP project is well on its way even before the offi-
cial studies begin.
This new enthusiasm for Asia Pacific activity is moti-
vated by five rnajor developments in the global trading sys-
tem. First, the indefinite suspensión of the Doha Round
has raised major doubts about the viability of worldwide
negotiations and even the WTO as an institution. Second,
especially for the United States, the increasing momentum
toward an Asia-wide free trade área raises the specter of
major new discrimination and an unstable three-bloc world
that would, in the memorable words of former Secretary of
State James Baker, «draw a line down the middle of the
Pacific.» Third, the even wider proliferation of bilateral
and subregional preferential trade pacts, which is likely to
accelerate further if Doha indeed fails, will produce further
disintegration of the multilateral system; those who worry
about the «spaghetti bowl» of such deals should strongly
support an FTAAP that can subsume many of them under
a single umbrella. Fourth, even those Asians that are skep-
tical of FTAAP specifics welcome the active engagement of
the United States in such a bold new regional initiative.
D O C U M E N T O S
Fifthj APEC itself has floundered badly in pursuing its own
liberalization goals and has been totally ineffectual in sup-
porting Doha. The FTAAP initiative provides an effective
response to all five concerns.
APEC's consideration of the FTAAP possibility, how-
ever, needs to move ahead quickly because of the domestic
political situation in the United States, intensified by the
sweeping victory of Democrats in the recent Congressional
elections. There are now even stronger signs that the Ad-
ministration will have great difficulty winning extensión of
the President*s Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) when it
expires next summer, without whích the United States will
be unable to particípate in any significant international trade
negotiations, without realistic prospects for at least one
major positive initiatíve. Continued suspensión of Doha,
or even progress toward a mini-package for the Round as
advocated by some, would leave the FTAAP as the only
candidate to play that role. America's trading partners in
the Asia Pacific región clearly want TPA to continué and
can substantially boostthatprospect by accelerating APEC's
movement toward an FTAAP though meetings of theír trade
ministers in early 2007.
In additioiij the highly possíble election of a Democratic
President in 2008 raises questions concerning the attitude
of the next Administration, in addition to the Congress,
toward enrering into any new trade talks. Henee it would
also behoove US trading partners to engage the FTAAP
negotiations with the supportive current Administration and
move the effort as far as possible while it remaíns in office.
Just as President Bill Clinton felt compelled to complete
the NAFTA when he inherited it from his Republícan pre-
decessor in 1993, any new US President would be under a
similar obligation with an FTAAP if its deliberations were
already well underway.
[To be sure, other important obstacles remaín that could
deraíl this potentially historie initiative. The APEC Lead-
ers themselves envisaged the FTAAP as only «a long-term
prospect.» Their officials could effectively bury the idea if
they succumb to APEC's tradítional «consensus rule» and
fail to créate innovative mechanisms, including the use of
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independent outside experts, to help with the mandated
studies. Decisions must be made on the agenda of issues to
be included, and whether to seek the high standards of US
FTAs or the low standards of China's FTAs or the middle
road of Japan's «economicpartnershipagreernents.» APEC
will have to admit that it is a negotiating institution, as it
clearly already is, but must also contémplate undertaking
binding commitments for the first time.
The single largest questíon, however, is probably the
position of China. Its support, on top of that of the United
States and Japan and the other APEC members noted aboye,
would clínch the launch of serious negotiations but China
expressed skepticism about the issue at Hanoi. Perhaps it
(and a couple of ASEAN countries) wants to continué em-
phasizing its bilateral trade pacts with other Asían coun-
tries, which are undertaken primarily for political reasons
andaré of low economía quality, instead of pursuingeíther
an FTAAP or the Doha Round with their broader geographí-
cal scope and higher standards. Perhaps it is reluctant to
include Taiwan, which has been accepted as a full partid-
pant in all APEC activities since 1991. Such considerations
would be extremely short-sighted on China's part, in light
of its looming trade conflicts with the United States and a
number of other APECmernbers thatcould best be defused
by entering into comprehensive Hberalizing and rule-mak-
ing negotiations via an FTAAP. Moreover, if most of the
other APEC members come to support the idea, China
would not want to be viewed as throwing its weight around
by vetoing the initiative.]
The initial step taken by the APEC Leaders in Hanoi
could turn out to be one of the most significant in the his-
tory of the world economy and even of world politics. Al-
ternatively, it could fizzle into irrelevance like many past
pronouncements of thatgroup. Decisions taken bythekey
APEC economies over the next few months will determine
the outcome, and perhaps with it the prospects for US trade
policy and the global trading system for years to come.
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